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Like it or not, war is a human universal. Not surpris-
ingly, social scientists try hard to understand its causes
and consequences. Yet, the challenge is great: the face
of war varies tremendously, along with the size, subsis-
tence base, and technology level of societies and has
therefore changed dramatically during human pre-
history and history, including the post-WWII period.
Enter Agner Fog’s regality theory. According to Fog,
the frequency or threat of war has profoundly affected
the structure of human societies, as reflected in the gra-
dient from peaceful to warlike, or in his parlance from
kungic to regal, societies. In a regal society, people will
prefer a strong leader to effectively deal with the exter-
nal threat and will accept a hierarchical political struc-
ture and strong discipline to deal with this threat. They
will also develop a strong feeling of tribal or national
identity, resulting in xenophobia and intolerance. Regal
societies are also expected to have stricter religions and
more rigid sexual mores, and even develop peculiar
grandiose styles of art and architecture. Kungic societ-
ies are at the opposite, more egalitarian and relaxed
end of the gradient.
Fog reviews studies of people’s attitudes and prefer-
ences across modern societies and concludes that they
all follow the kungic-regal gradient. He also offers an
extensive review of studies of modern wars, stressing
how they have changed during the past half-century,
and how elites manipulate, deceive, and engage in fear-
mongering in order to stay in power, all the while mak-
ing ready use of the tendency of the mass media to
exaggerate threats, known as the ‘mean world syn-
drome’ (or controlling the media to ensure this hap-
pens). Linked to this, Fog cites a variety of case studies
in support of his view that leaders and contenders for
leadership exaggerate threats in order to increase public
acceptance of their rule.
A special feature of the book is the presentation of
18 carefully verified ethnographies of selected pre-
industrial societies, ranging from nomadic foragers to
highly stratified kingdoms. This is followed by a statis-
tical analysis of the standard cross-sectional sample of
non-industrial societies as well as the subset of detailed
case studies, and a similar analysis of the survey of con-
temporary worldviews. All analyses find support for
regality theory.
Despite these positive aspects, the book does not
incorporate the results of recent work looking for expla-
nations inspired by evolutionary biology. This means
there are reasons to worry that it overestimates the
impact of war or misdiagnoses particular cases. I will
make some specific comments based on these new
approaches to illustrate their value.
First, regality theory does not distinguish between
within-society inequality that arose through command
hierarchies emerging in the face of an external threat
on one hand, and inequality that arose as a result of
purely internal processes based on resource monopoli-
zation by powerful elites on the other hand. Perhaps,
this is because the author implicitly assumes that this
suppression can only work when societies frequently
engage in war, but an alternative possibility links elite
formation, with the attending patriarchical structure
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and polygynous mating system, to the monopolizabil-
ity of critical resources and the loss of interdepen-
dence upon the adoption of sedentism and food
production, especially where this is accompanied by
storage (Mattison, Smith, Shenk, & Cochrane, 2016).
The author therefore does not explore the possibility
that within-group processes historically produced
elites first and that these elites subsequently became
addicted to (offensive) war in order to maintain their
benefits in the face of their rapidly expanding num-
bers. As a result, there is no analysis of how external
threat interacts with these within-group monopoliza-
tion processes and how the outcome of this conflict
affects the features of the societies concerned.
A second problem is that the book fundamentally
assumes that engaging in warfare is always so risky that
a serious collective action problem arises, in other
words that free-riding would be adaptive and that send-
ing men to war is always against their interests. This
may well be true for enlisted soldiers in modern societ-
ies, but need not have held in small-scale, egalitarian
societies, in which raids and surprise ambushes were
the rule (Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013). Our war psy-
chology may thus have evolved in days when warfare
was conducted in completely different ways.
Related to this, Fog conflates leadership, where indi-
viduals can bestow status upon someone, and domi-
nance, where status is based on coercion. In the first
case, one may assume that the tendency to follow a
leader is both voluntary and adaptive, whereas the
opposite holds in the second case. The ethnographic lit-
erature often mentions war leaders in small-scale egali-
tarian societies, who are appointed by the others and
derive major prestige from being a war leader, but
become a regular member of society once the war is
over. The presentation of regality theory does not dis-
tinguish between situations where leaders are followed
voluntarily and those where leaders coerce the rest into
following them. We should expect very different socie-
tal dynamics in the two cases, and by ignoring the
distinction we run the risk of attributing all support for
war as the product of deception, or of missing what
makes such deception possible in the first place. Indeed,
leaders may be able to coordinate genuine excitement
about engaging in war in the population, even in societ-
ies with inequality, when the population feels they face
an existential threat. Thus, agent-based models by
Turchin, Currie, Truner, and Gavrilets (2013) show
how the raiding and plundering by equestrian nomads
forged polities together to organize communal defense,
leading to the rise of empires with overall positive
effects on the wellbeing of their inhabitants.
Overall, therefore, the book may not provide a com-
plete explanation for all the features of societies. First,
it does not control for the effects of within-group pro-
cesses unrelated to warfare, which makes it difficult to
estimate the independent effect of regality per se. Not
every feature of modern societies, including classical
music or majestic architecture, need be a product of
warfare. And second, it fails to examine the idea that
manipulating mismatched war psychology made it pos-
sible for elites to maintain coercive power in modern
societies. These problems aside, it presents a valuable
overview of the extensive literature on the societal cor-
relates of modern warfare and makes a convincing, and
timely, case for the deceptive use of the threat of war
by populists or budding dictators.
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